London helicopter crash pilot ‘distracted by radio’ – London – News – London Evening Standard

Mr Barnes, 50, from Berkshire, died when the AgustaWestland 109 he was piloting crashed into a crane at the side of The Tower at St George Wharf at 8am on Wednesday, just yards from Vauxhall Station.

His helicopter plunged to the ground 700ft below, killing Matthew Wood, 39, from Sutton, south London as he walked to work.

Mr Barnes had been flying from Redhill in Surrey to Elstree, Hertfordshire, but he asked to be diverted to Battersea heliport because of bad weather.

A couple of points I think are worth making:

1. The crane was not new to that location and the crane operator had reported the location. It has been listed in the NOTAMS for months. The crane may have been a factor but it is not at all clear that it was the cause.
2. The pilot was highly experienced and regularly flew in and out of London.
3. The pilot was changing frequency in a normal fashion. The fact that he was “out of contact” is not, in itself, an issue, other than that it coincides with the time of the accident.
4. It is unclear why the pilot infringed the NOTAM and collided with the crane. Any one giving a reason at this stage is guessing.
5. There are a lot of cranes (and high buildings) in London. There are thousands of helicopters flying over London every month. Looking at CAA data for helicopter operations within the London Heathrow and London City control zones, there are 170,000 movements listed since 2007. Over the same time period, the number of fatal incidents is one. This one.

It’s a terrible tragedy and the type of accident that really should never happen. But as of now, there are many factors that could come into play. The helicopter could have had a critical failure before flying into the crane. The pilot could have been incapacited. We just don’t know.

Hopefully, we will have answers soon. The AAIB have begun their investigation. Personally, I’m waiting on their report before declaring that Something Must Be Done.

Forty years ago on the 29th of December in 1972, Eastern Air Lines Flight 401 crashed into the Florida Everglades. It was an uneventful flight from JFK until shortly before they were at the approach at Miami Airport. When the flight-crew lowered the landing gear, they did not receive confirmation that the nose wheel was down and locked. The indicator light did not come on. The flight crew investigated the problem as jet circled west over the Everlades at 2,000 feet.

A lightbulb had burned out in the cockpit. That was all. But the issue distracted the crew completely.

The Captain recycled the landing gear but the green light did not come on. The flight crew confirmed they were climbing to 2,000 feet to investigate the problem. They were unsure if the indicator light was faulty or the landing gear had failed to deploy. There was a manual override on the landing gear, so that even if the hydraulics were faulty, the landing gear could still be lowered.

The Captain, the First Officer and the Second Officer were joined by a passenger sitting in the jumpseat, a maintenance engineer returning to Miami. Four qualified aviation professionals were now looking at the problem. The Second Officer descended into the forward electronics bay to check on the nose gear. All four men in the cockpit focused on trouble-shooting the problem and not a single one was watching the flight instruments. No one was flying the plane.

Eastern Airlines Flight 401: The Ghosts of Memories Past by Eric D. Olson

In unison, we looked up to see the silhouette of a Lockheed L1011 flying westbound at an altitude of about 2,000 feet. It was somewhere between 11:30 pm and 11:35 pm, a fact that I specifically remember because I took the time to look at my wristwatch and comment to Bill. The underside of the L1011 was reflecting the ground lighting from the airport and the surrounding city which made it easy to identify the aircraft type although we couldn’t identify the airline. (The largest L1011 operators then at MIA were Eastern Airlines and Delta Airlines, but I don’t recall seeing any airline markings when the L1011 was overhead.)

What was so strange was that it was there in the first place. It was rare for commercial airliners to fly westbound directly overhead Opa locka Airport at such a relatively low altitude. The control tower at Opa locka shut down at 11pm each evening back then so the L1011 had to be in contact with Miami Approach Control, since we assumed it was ultimately being vectored for an approach to MIA.

The Captain leaned against the yoke while turning to speak to the flight engineer. This pressure on the control stick caused the aircraft to enter a slow descent. The autopilot – inadvertently set to control wheel steering mode – held the pitch attitude as set by the pilot, continuing the gentle descent while the crew continued to investigate the possible nose gear malfunction.

The First Officer jammed the nose gear light lens assembly when he was trying to replace it. As the Captain and the First Officer discussed the jammed assembly, a chime sounded to alert the crew that they had descended below 2,000 feet but no one paid any attention.

The Second Officer complained that he couldn’t see anything in the dark. The maintenance specialist who was in the jump seat entered the electronics bay to help him.

There was nothing wrong with the nose gear. A $12 lightbulb in the control panel had burnt out.

Remembering Eastern Flight 401: The Story of the Crash | MiamiHerald.com

The Lockheed L-1011 began a stealth descent. No one in the cockpit noticed. In the cabin, all readied to land.

Ruiz, seated facing the back of the plane, walked over to flight attendant Pat Ghyssels and wondered why the aircraft was flying away from the city lights.

“She said to me: ‘Oh, Mercy, stop complaining. It’s the holidays. If we’re a little late, it’s overtime,’‚” Ruiz said.

The approach controller asked how they were doing, noticing that the flight was at 900 feet on his radar display. He wasn’t sure if it was a display issue or the aircraft but he said he wasn’t worried.

Captain Loft, finally convinced that the problem was simply the bulb, told the controller that they were ready to turn around and come back in. At 23:41:47, the approach controller confirmed their clearance. The aircraft started the turn back towards Miami.

The flight-crew noticed something amiss seconds before impact. The First Officer’s final words were “We’re still at 2,000 feet, right?” That’s when the left wing hit the ground.

The aircraft disappeared from the controller’s radar screen at 23:42:10.

Out in the darkness, Bud Marquis and a friend were hunting frogs.

Flight 401 part 5

He’d launch his airboat at the Miccosukee Indian Reservation on the Tamiami Trail and race north into the river of grass.

On a moonless night, in the beam of his head lamp, the frog eyes would glow like rubies. He’d cruise up on the frog, spear the frog with the 3-pronged gig, knock the frog off the gig into a sack, all the while moving forward in the airboat while getting ready to gig another frog. Mama, heat up the frying pan. We’re having legs tonight.

Bud Marquis had experienced better nights of frogging. But he and his helper had 30 pounds of legs.

“Then I saw this great big fireball and the whole ‘glades lit up. Then zip, the light was out.”Bud revved up the engine and headed northwest.

That section of the Everglades is a tangle of sawgrass, tree islands, canals and levees. Fortunately, Bud was an expert. With the engine dangerously wide open – the boat slipped over the grass at 35 mph – he maneuvered around all obstacles.

Then wham! Aground. When he stopped the engine to push the boat back into the water, he heard a chorus of terrified human voices, hollering, moaning, shrieking.

He cranked up the engine and moved toward the sound. He shut down the engine again to listen. “Hey! Hey! Hey!” Someone had seen his frogging light.

In the narrow beam of his head lamp he now saw enormous strips of torn metal. He saw openings in the sawgrass created by sliding chunks of broken airplane. He saw a man standing, shocked, in knee-deep water.

Bud was first on the scene. He burned his face, his arms and his legs but he never stopped trying to rescue the passengers from the burning aircraft, all that night and the following morning. As a direct result of his efforts, seventy-seven people survived the crash. The maintenance engineer, the passenger in the jumpseat, broke his back in the impact but survived.

Ninety-nine people, including the flight crew, died that night. Two more died as a result of injury or infection.

The Ghosts of Flight 401

Over the following months and years, employees of Eastern Air Lines began reporting sightings of the dead crew members, captain Robert Loft and second officer (flight engineer) Donald Repo, sitting on board other L-1011 (N318EA) flights.

Parts of Flight 401 were salvaged after the crash investigation and refitted into other L-1011s.The reported hauntings were only seen on the planes that used the spare parts. Sightings of the spirits of Don Repo and Bob Loft spread throughout Eastern Air Lines to the point where Eastern’s management warned employees that they could face dismissal if caught spreading ghost stories.

While Eastern Airlines publicly denied some of their planes were haunted, they reportedly removed all the salvaged parts from their L-1011 fleet. Over time, the reporting of ghost sightings stopped. An original floor board from Flight 401 remains in the archives at History Miami in South Florida.

The source of the ghost stories appears to have been an issue of Flight Safety Foundation, who interviewed a pilot who had lost an engine, making for a challenging landing. He joked that he “saw the ghost of Don Repo” which was later presented by a best-selling author as fact in his book, The Ghost of Flight 401.

File No. 1-0016 Aircraft Accident Report Eastern Air Lines, Inc. December 29, 1972

An Eastern Air Lines Lockheed L-1011 crashed at 2342 eastern standard time, December 29, 1972, 18.7 miles west-northwest of Miami International Airport, Miami Florida. The aircraft was destroyed. Of the 163 passengers and 13 crew-members aboard, 94 passengers and 5 crew members received fatal injuries. Two survivors died later as a result of their injuries.

Following a missed approach because of a suspected nose gear malfunction, the aircraft climbed to 2,000 feet mean sea level and proceeded on a westerly heading. The three flight crew-members and a jumpseat occupant became engrossed in the malfunction.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the flightcrew to monitor the flight instruments during the final 4 minutes of flight, and to detect an unexpected descent soon enough to prevent impact with the ground.

Preoccupation with a malfunction of the nose landing gear position indicating system distracted the crew’s attention from the instruments and allowed the descent to go unnoticed.

The two pilots were co-owners of VH-CNZ. She was a commercial pilot with over 10,000 hours, 600 of them on type. One blog post at the time said that she was a flight instructor. He was a private pilot with just over 2,500 hours and 120 on type. VH-CNZ was a Piper Twin Comanche which had just had a new propeller governor fitted on the left side. They were at Archerfield airport near Brisbane, taking the aircraft out to test the governor.

The Piper Twin Comanche is a very fuel-efficient twin, with four tanks: a tip tank and an auxiliary tank on each wing. The fuel tank fillers are on either side of the engine nacelle.

When the aircraft refueller arrived, the commercial pilot was sitting in the cockpit and the private pilot was doing the preflight checks. Conditions were good but it was late afternoon and the sun was low in the sky. The pilots may have felt under pressure to hurry before the sunset. After the plane was fuelled, the aircraft taxied to Runway 10 right for take-off.

Archerfield Plate showing Runway 10 right and the position of the Tower

The plane departed at 17:15. It impacted the ground at 17:16.

17:14 CNZ Archer Tower Twin Comanche Charlie November Zulu is ready Runway 10 right departing to the southeast (male voice).
17:14 Tower Charlie November Zulu Tower Runway right cleared for takeoff.
17:14 CNZ Runway right cleared for takeoff Charlie November Zulu (male voice)

Immediately after take-off, the Tower controller spotted a cloud of “greyish black smoke” coming from both sides of the left engine. He contacted the aircraft immediately.

17:15 Tower Charlie November Zulu there is smoke coming from one of your engines (pause) it’s the left engine.
17:15 Tower Charlie November Zulu did you copy?

The aircraft passed abeam the tower still overhead the runway. There was sufficient runway and overrun to land the aircraft and decelerate significantly before reaching the boundary fence.

17:15 CNZ Charlie November Zulu affirm. We’re shutting it down and request a left turn back for landing (female voice).
17:15 Tower Charlie November Zulu left turn approved.
17:15 CNZ Charlie November Zulu (female voice).
17:16 Tower Charlie November Zulu clear to land.
17:16 CNZ Clear to land Charlie November Zulu (female voice).

Shutting down the engine in a twin propeller aircraft causes a thrust imbalance. The plane will yaw towards the inoperative engine. When turning into the dead engine, there’s a tendency to overbank. The pilot must consistently counteract this imbalance.

In a conventional twin-engined propeller plane like the Piper Twin Comanche, the left engine is considered the “critical engine,” as shutting it down has a larger effect than shutting down the right engine, as a result of the asymmetric blade and disc effects. An example of this effect in a single engine plane is that the aircraft will tend to yaw to the left when using a clockwise turning propeller. In a multi-engine propeller aircraft, the engine with the down-moving blades produces more yaw, which in this case is the left. The shutdown of the left engine requires more pilot input to maintain straight flight than the right engine would.

The loss of the engine obviously also affects the flight performance of the aircraft. Initially, it is important to “clean up” the plane: to retract the landing gear and flaps, feather the inoperative propeller and ensure that the airspeed is maintained. This is especially critical at low altitude.

The flight crew shut down the left engine and the aircraft yawed sharply left and then to the right before commencing a left-hand circuit at 100 feet above the ground. The landing gear was extended throughout. The left engine was shut down but the propeller was not feathered.

Archerfield Tower by Cybergothiche

The control tower cabin at Archerfield is at 65 feet above ground level. The controller reported that as the aircraft passed abeam the tower, it appeared to be slightly below the tower cabin.

As the aircraft approached the western boundary of the airport, the aircraft turned left again. As it turned, the angle of bank suddenly increased. The Piper Twin Comanche was nose-down, inverted and rolling left when it impacted, 250 metres (820 feet) from the threshold of Runway 10. Both pilots were killed.

There was no evidence of fire. The left engine showed no signs of damage other than from the impact. No pre-existing fault of the propellers could be found. Based on the ground contact marks, the right engine was developing significant power at the point of impact. The left propeller was rotating but the engine was not developing power.

The left-wing fuel filler flap covers were open and both filler caps were missing. The caps were discovered on the runway and the adjoining clear way. The ground was wet under the inverted left wing where the fuel had poured out of the left tanks on impact.

The aircraft refueller recalled that the private pilot who was doing the pre-flight checks said that he would secure the caps himself after re-fuelling, as they were non-standard. Checking the fuel caps are secure is a part of the standard pre-flight checks. The refueller stated that he filled the right tanks first and as he moved to the left side of the aircraft, he saw the pilot move towards the right tank. The refueller filled both the main and auxilliary tank is on the left side and placed the caps in the filler port of each tank. He did not secure the caps, as requested, and he left the flap covers open.

As he finished the refuelling, he saw the pilot lying beneath the fuselage, apparently conducting a fuel drain check. He told the commercial pilot, who was in the cockpit, that he had added 179 litres of fuel to the tanks and reminded her that the fuel caps were not secure.

The open flap covers were visible from the cockpit. The dark underside of the flap covers should have been clearly visible against the white upper surface of the wing. In any event, it is clear that the caps on the left wing were not secured and it is unlikely that the flap covers were closed.

They might have been in a rush, as the sun was setting and they wished to complete the test that afternoon. The pre-flight inspection may not have been completed. In addition, as a result of the failing light, the open flap covers on the wing may not have been as obvious.

As the aircraft rumbled down Runway 10 right for take-off, the caps fell from the left-wing filler ports. As the Piper Twin Comanche took off, the fuel vented from the open tank filler ports on the left wing. In the deteriorating light, the venting fuel appearing from either side of the engine nacelle appeared as smoke to the tower controller and witnesses on the ground.

There’s no evidence that the pilots had any indication in the cockpit of a malfunction. It is unclear whether the pilots saw the “smoke” or recognised that the fuel flap covers were open. It appears they shut down the left engine based solely on the traffic controller’s report of smoke. Rather than clean up the aircraft, gaining airspeed and altitude before manoeuvring, the pilots turned directly into the dead engine. The left engine propeller was not feathered, the landing gear was not retracted and, from the beginning, the aircraft was low and slow. The pilots reacted to a non-emergency in a rushed manner. Rather than recognising the abilities of the Piper Twin Comanche under one engine and flying the plane, they turned into the circuit without preparation. As they entered the third and final left turn, they completely lost control of the aircraft.

Investigation: 200102253 – Piper Aircraft Corp PA-30, VH-CNZ

SIGNIFICANT FACTORS:

• The left wing fuel tank filler caps were not secured before takeoff.
• Fuel vented from the left wing fuel tanks and had the appearance of smoke coming from the left engine.
• The pilot(s) did not take the appropriate actions to maintain aircraft performance after shutting down the left engine.
• The pilot(s) were unable to maintain control of the aircraft.

Thanks to r/aviation for helping me to understand the effects of twin flight with one engine.

The Air Accident Investigation Unit in Ireland has just released the serious incident report regarding the runway incursion at Dublin Airport on the 21st May 2011.

Serious Incident: (1) AIRBUS A321-231, G-OZBS and (2) BOEING 737-8AS, EI-DPT, at Dublin Airport (EIDW), Ireland on 21 May 2011: Report 2012-017

The incident involved two aircraft and two air traffic controllers.

The aircraft which infringed active Runway 16 was an Airbus A321-231 registration G-OZBS.

G-OZBS was a Monarch flight from Dublin to Tenerife carrying 6 crew and 152 passengers.

The aircraft taking off on Runway 16 was a Boeing 737-8AS registration EI-DPT.

EI-DPT was a Ryanair flight from Dublin to Vilnius carrying six crew and 145 passengers.

The SMC (surface moments control) was provided by the Ground Controller.

The AMC (air movements control), including coordination of landing and departing aircraft, was handled by the Tower Controller.

The Monarch aircraft, G-OZBS, was parked at Stand 35 at Pier B, after arriving late from a previous flight. The Captain – the Pilot Flying for the incident – took command of the aircraft for his first flight of the day.

Runway 16, a 2,072m asphalt runway, was active. However, G-OZBS requested runway 28, a 2,637m asphalt runway as the aircraft was heavy.

This was granted and G-OZBS was cleared by Ground Control to Push Back and start.

At 16:44:20, G-OZBS requested and received taxi clearance:

“Turn right taxi Apron 4 hold short of Link 2.”

Following along with the chart, you can see Pier B in the top right and Link 2 leading to the taxiways east of where the runway thresholds meet. The red circles mark runway incursion hot spots. At the time of the incident, point A did not have a red circle.

G-OZBS was asked to hold short of Link 2 until the incoming aircraft passed. The Ground Controller told him to then continue F1, E1, hold short Runway 28 and then change to the Tower frequency.

The next thing the Ground Controller recalled was looking out the window and seeing G-OZBS infringing Runway 16.

The landing aircraft taxied to the end of the Runway 16 and turned off onto B2. G-OZBS was at the F1 intersection when the landing aircraft passed it.

The Captain of G-OZBS stated that he incorrectly assumed that the landing aircraft was on taxiway F and not on Runway 16, as it was travelling slowly. He further stated that if big bright wig-wags were installed on A, it would have been more obvious that they were approaching an active runway.

In other words, he completely misidentified the aircraft’s position.

The First Officer said that the tarmac was wet and thus the yellow markings on the taxiway were difficult to see.

The Ground Controller stated that she had no reason to think that G-OZBS would not follow her instructions and, having cleared the aircraft to Tower control, she diverted her attention elsewhere.

And so, G-OZBS continued its taxi. It’s a confusing set of taxiways there, so let’s take a closer look:

At Link 2, on the intersection of A and F1, the aircraft should have turned left onto F1. Instead, G-OZBS went straight ahead onto A.

At the same time, the Tower Controller cleared EI-DPT, the Ryanair flight en route to Vilnius, for take-off on Runway 16.

EI-DPT acknowledged the clearance and commenced its take-off run.

G-OZBS switched frequency to Tower and entered Runway 16.

The Cockpit Voice Recorder shows that shortly before V1, there was a voice overlap between Ryanair’s Captain(PF) and the First Officer(PNF):

PF/PNF: Where’s that Mon/Where’s that guy going
PNF: He’s taxiing out in front of us
PF/PNF: Stop/Abandon

G-OZBS: The First Officer questioned their position and stopped the aircraft on the runway.

EI-DPT: The Captain initiated a high speed rejected take-off.

When she realised that the taxiing aircraft had entered the runway the Commander immediately abandoned the take-off, thus breaking an accumulating and potentially threatening chain of events, and instructed the PNF to inform ATC. During the take-off run the FDR showed that the rejected take off commenced at approximately 124 kts indicated airspeed, or 4 kts under V1, and a peak speed of 134 kts was reached.

The Tower Controller scanned the runway and saw that G-OZBS had made a runway incursion. He contacted EI-DPT to tell them to stop. The First Officer responded: “We’re stopped.”

The Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System recorded the movements of the planes.

At 16:47:39 G-OZBS was recorded at the edge of Runway 16, which it then entered and stopped.

At 16:47:48 EI-DPT reached its peak ground speed and commenced decelerating.

Total response time: 7 seconds. It was just enough.

EI-DPT, the Ryanair Boeing 737, stopped 360 metres from G-OZBS having travelled a total of 1,455 metres from the threshold of Runway 16.

When asked by the Investigation if she had carried out an actual rejected take-off before, the Captain of EI-DPT said no. She added, “all that simulator training works.”

The Tower Controller told G-OZBS to vacate the runway as quickly as possible onto Runway 28. He then cleared EI-DPT to exit via taxiway A and advised a third aircraft that it was clear to land on 16. “It all happened very quickly,” he said.

EI-DPT returned to the stand for a technical inspection of the braking system.

G-OZBS lined up on Runway 28. The crew completed their take-off checks and the aircraft was cleared for take-off three minutes later.

Probable Cause

The flight crew of G-OZBS lost situational awareness, having misidentified their position, and taxied onto an active runway while another aircraft was taking off.

Contributory Causes
1. Sunshine on a wet pavement probably rendered pavement markings and runway signage less visible to the crew as they taxied directly towards a low strong sun.
2. Crew workload and unfamiliarity with the complex taxiway markings and signage.
3. The absence of an illuminated stop bar on taxiway A and the presence of one on E2.

You know, I never thought I’d say this, but I feel really sorry for Ryanair. I just know they got all the grumbling for being late at their destination…

You can download the full report as a PDF at AAIU.ie: Serious Incident: (1) AIRBUS A321-231, G-OZBS and (2) BOEING 737-8AS, EI-DPT, at Dublin Airport (EIDW), Ireland on 21May 2011: Report 2012-017

On the 16th of September in 2011, at the National Championship Air Races at Reno, Nevada, a small aircraft lost control and crashed into a spectator box.

The Galloping Ghost, an experimental single-seater P-51D, was travelling at about 445 knots (512 mph) in the third lap of a six-lap race.

Coming past pylons 6 and 7, the Galloping Ghost was at 458 knots ground speed according to the GPS; the fastest that the airplane had flown on the course by about 35 knots.

As it passed pylon 8, it experienced a left-roll upset.

A “substantial right-wing-down aileron deflection was evident” which was probably the pilot’s last action to get out of the left roll.

The aircraft responded with a right roll but also pitched up. The vertical G-levels rose from about 3G to 17.3G, outside of human tolerances. The pilot’s time of useful consciousness is estimated at less than one second.

A section of the left elevator trim tab separated in flight. The airplane went into a spiral dive and crashed into a ramp in the spectator box seating area.

The Galloping Ghost broke into pieces. The pilot and ten people on the ground were killed. Another 64 people on the ground were injured.

The NTSB has now released the final report as a PDF: Aircraft Accident Brief: Pilot/Race 177, The Galloping Ghost.

The 70-year-old aircraft, they have determined, was unsafe.

The only documented major modification was the installation of a boil-off cooling system. Many other completely undocumented structural and flight control modifications were identified through wreckage examinations.

Illustration of the accident airplane with stock P-51D dimensions shown in red.

The wings were shortened, the elevator counterweights were increased, the vertical and horizontal stabilizers had been modified with filler material until their weight was over doubled the specified maximum, the rudder had the trim tab and control cables removed and the elevator trim tab system was modified.

The reasons for many of the modifications could not be established. Neither the pilot’s family members nor the airplane’s ground crew were aware of any detailed drawings, engineering calculations, or other substantiating data for any of the modifications

The right elevator trim tab was fixed in place. The aircraft thus had a single, controllable elevator trim tab on the left elevator and a fixed tab on the right, instead of the standard for the aircraft: two controllable trim tabs, one on each elevator. There was a high aerodynamic load on the controllable tab as a result. Also, both trim tabs had an increased potential for flutter.

Fluttering is a rapid motion, oscillation or vibration which can range from an annoying buzzing sound to the “violent destructive failure of the structure in a very short period of time”. The two factors which affect flutter are aircraft speed and structural stiffness.

Airplane during left roll upset before it reached maximum left bank angle. Inset shows detail of left elevator trim tab and the cut out in the elevator for the trim tab link assembly. Photograph by Jonathon Apfelbaum.

The investigators found that the elevator trim tab attachment screws on both sides were loose. The locknuts had yellow paint on them, which means they were probably installed 26 years previously when the trim tabs were painted yellow.

The screws were likely tightened 4 days before the accident flight when the technical inspection found a discrepancy on the right trim tab attachment screws, and the airplane had accumulated only three flights (including the accident flight) since that time. The loosening of the trim tab attachment screws and the deteriorated condition of the locknut inserts should have been noticeable to the ground crew.

There was a fatigue crack in one of the screws which meant that the structural stiffness of the elevator trim system was compromised. This decreased stiffness allowed for aerodynamic flutter of the trim tabs. The flutter caused “dynamic compressive loads in the left elevator trim tab’s link assembly that increased beyond its buckling strength”.

Other modifications to the elevator counterweights and inertia weight made the aircraft more sensitive to pitch control. However, the NTSB concludes that the loss of control as a result of the damage to the trim tab linkages led to the crash.

Inboard piece of left elevator trim tab separated
Photograph courtesy of Julia Kirchenbauer.

Probable Cause
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determines that the probable cause of this accident was the reduced stiffness of the elevator trim tab system that allowed aerodynamic flutter to occur at racing speeds. The reduced stiffness was a result of deteriorated locknut inserts that allowed the trim tab attachment screws to become loose and to initiate fatigue cracking in one screw sometime before the accident flight. Aerodynamic flutter of the trim tabs resulted in a failure of the left trim tab link assembly, elevator movement, high flight loads, and a loss of control. Contributing to the accident were the undocumented and untested major modifications to the airplane and the pilot’s operation of the airplane in the unique air racing environment without adequate flight testing.

You can watch the full NTSB hearing including the safety recommendations on YouTube:

Over a decade later, I am writing about the September 11 attacks for the first time. Initially it was just too raw and I couldn’t stand to try to analyse the situation when my own emotions were so close to the surface. Then, each anniversary, it seemed like everyone was writing about it and I couldn’t see the point of adding to the noise.

I have only just read the 9/11 Commission Report. Over the years, I’ve thought about individual events of that terrible morning but until now, I’ve not been able to think about the attacks as a whole. Reading the commission report, I found myself seeing the unfurling of the attacks.

There is nothing new in my analysis below, simply a change in viewpoint. Rather than look at each plane individually, I focused on the straight-forward timeline of that morning and how the information spread during the initial flights.

All references are from The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Authorized Edition). If you are interested in the full detail, you can read the report online as a Google Book at The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. It is also available in paperback or as an e-book from Amazon US and Amazon UK. All times are given in local time (Eastern Daylight Time).

Tuesday, September 11, 2001, dawned temperate and nearly cloudless in the eastern United States. Millions of men and women readied themselves for work. Some made their way to the Twin Towers, the signature structures of the World Trade Center complex in New York City. Others went to Arlington, Virginia, to the Pentagon. Across the Potomac River, the United States Congress was back in session. At the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, people began to line up for a White House tour. In Sarasota, Florida, President George W. Bush went for an early morning run.

06:45 Mohamed Atta and Abdul Aziz al Omary arrive at Logan International Airport in Boston, Massachusetts. Atta, Omary, as well as Satam al Suqami, Wail al Shehri and Waleed al Shehri check in for American Airlines Flight 11, bound for Los Angeles with a scheduled departure of 07:45. In another terminal at Logan Airport, Marwan al Shehhi, Fayez Banihammad, Mohand al Shehri, Ahmed al Ghamdi and Hamza al Ghamdi check in for United Airlines Flight 175, bound for Los Angeles with a scheduled departure of 08:00.

07:03-07:39 At Newark Liberty International Airport in New Jersey, Saeed al Ghamdi, Ahmed al Nami, Ahmad al Haznawi and Ziad Jarra check in for United Airlines Flight 93, bound for San Francisco with a scheduled departure of 08:00.

07:15 At Washington Dulles International Airport, Khalid al Mihdar and Majed Moqed check in for American Airlines Flight 77, bound for Los Angeles with a scheduled departure of 08:10. They are joined by Hani Hanjour and the Hazmi brothers, Nawaf and Salem.

Several of the hijackers were flagged as a risk and, as a result, selected for extra screening of their checked bags. Two of them set off alarms with their carry-on bags but passed a second test. Two of the hijackers had their checked bags held until they boarded the aircraft. No other consequence followed the screening.

07:23-07:48 The five hijackers of United Airlines Flight 175 board the plane and take their seats in business class.

07:30 The five hijackers of American Flight 11 board the plane and take their seats in business class.

07:39-07:48 The four hijackers of United Flight 93 board the plane and take their seats in the first-class cabin.

07:40 American Airlines Flight 11 pushes back.

07:50 The five hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77 board the plane and take their seats, two in coach, three in first-class.

Nineteen men are now aboard four transcontinental flights and ready to initiate their attack. The security screening did not stop them. Although the hijackers later claim to have bombs, this was almost certainly a bluff.

07:58 United Airlines Flight 175 pushes back.

07:59 American Airlines Flight 111 departs Logan International Airport.

08:09 American Airlines Flight 77 pushes back

08:14 United Airlines Flight 175 departs Logan International Airport.

08:14 American Airlines Flight 11 acknowledges navigational instructions from Boston ATC.

16 seconds later, ATC instructs the flight crew to climb to 35,000 feet. No response is received from the pilots.

08:19 On American Airlines Flight 11, Flight Attendant Betty Ong uses an airphone to contact the American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office and report an emergency aboard the flight. Flight Attendant Amy Sweeney also contacted American Airlines to report and relay updates.

08:20 American Airlines Flight 77 departs Washington Dulles airport.

08:21 American Airlines Flight 11 turns off its transponder.

A few minutes later, the microphone is keyed and air traffic controllers hear the hijackers’ transmissions meant for the cabin. The first transmission is not clearly understood by the controller. The second transmission is broadcast clearly and the controller realises that the plane has been hijacked: “Nobody move, Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves, you’ll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet.”

The message of the first transmission is not understood until an hour later. The hijacker had said: “We have some planes. Just stay quiet, and you’ll be okay. We are returning to the airport.”

08:26 Flight Attendant Betty Ong reports that American Airlines Flight 11 is flying erratically. The aircraft turns south.

08:33 United Airlines Flight 175 reaches cruising altitude of 31,000 feet.

08:34 Boston Center controller receives a third unintended transmission from American Airlines Flight 11. “Nobody move please. We are going back to the airport. Don’t try to make any stupid moves.”

08:37 Northeast Air Defense Sector are contacted by Boston Center. This is the first notification received by the military that American 11 has been hijacked.

You can’t blame them for the initial response: “Is this real-world or exercise?” It’s swiftly clear that this is a real emergency and Northeast Air Defense Sector order two F-15s to battle station.

08:42 United Airlines Flight 175 flightcrew report a suspicious transmission overheard from another aircraft: “Ah, we heard a suspicious transmission on our departure out of Boston, ah, with someone, ah, it sounded like someone keyed the mikes and said ah everyone ah stay in your seats.”

This is the last communication from United Airlines Flight 175 flight crew.

08:42 United Flight 93 departs Newark Liberty International Airport.

08:44 Contact with Flight Attendant Betty Ong on American Airlines Flight 11 is lost. Flight Attendant Amy Sweeney reports that they are in a rapid descent and flying “way too low”.

08:46 Two F-15 fighters are scrambled but Northeast Air Defense Sector do not know where to send them.

08:46 American Airlines Flight 77 reaches cruising altitude of 35,000 feet.

08:46:40 American Airlines Flight 11 crashes into the North Tower of the World Trade Center.

08:47 United Airlines Flight 175 changes transponder codes twice within a minute.

The controller responsible for this flight is desperately trying to locate American Airlines Flight 11 and does not notice.

08:51 United Airlines Flight 175 deviates from its assigned altitude. The air traffic controller attempts to contact the aircraft and receives no response.

08:51 American Airlines Flight 77 transmits its last routine radio communication.

08:52 A passenger and a flight attendant on United Airlines Flight 175 make phone calls from the cabin to report the hijacking.

08:54 American Airlines Flight 77 deviates from its assigned course, turning south.

08:56 American Airlines Flight 77 transponder is turned off. Controllers attempt to to contact the aircraft but do not receive a response.

Indianapolis Center reports that the aircraft has had a serious electrical or mechanical failure and possible crash.

08:58 United Airlines Flight 175 changes heading towards New York City

09:00 American Airlines Executive Vice President Gerard Arpey learns that communications have been lost with American Airlines Flight 77 and grounds all American Airlines flights in the north east.

09:00 The passenger on United Airlines Flight 175 phones again, reports that the plane is making jerky movements and passengers are throwing up.

The call is cut off.

09:03:11 United Airlines Flight 175 strikes the South Tower of the World Trade Center.

09:03 Boston Center staff analysing the hijacker transmission from American Airlines Flight 11 realise that the initial message included the phrase “we have some planes” and the scale of the attack becomes clear.

Controllers at Boston Center request that Herndon Command Center “get messages to airborne aircraft to increase security for the cockpit”. There is no evidence of Herndon taking this action.

09:12 Passengers on American Airlines Flight 77 make a phone calls from the rear of the cabin to report the hijacking.

09:19 United flight dispatcher begins transmitting warnings to the 16 United transcontinental flights currently in the air.

09:20 Indianapolis Center become aware of the situation in New York and realise that American Airlines Flight 77 may also have been hijacked and reports the aircraft as lost.

09:23 United Flight 93 receives warning message from the United flight dispatcher. The pilot responds asking for confirmation.

09:38 United Flight 93 suddenly drops 700 feet. A Mayday message is broadcast with sounds of a physical struggle in the cockpit.

09:29 The autopilot on American Airlines Flight 77 is disengaged. The aircraft is at 7,000 feet and approximately 38 miles west of the Pentagon.

09:30 Northeast Air Defense Sector scramble fighters at Langley after a report of a hijacked aircraft heading for Washington DC.

However, they are told that it is American Airlines Flight 11 that is heading towards Washington, although it had already crashed into the South Tower.

The fighter jets are given an easterly heading to send them to the Baltimore area to position between a non-existent southbound American Flight 11 and Washington DC. Their flight plan did not include a distance nor the target’s location.

09:32 Controllers at Dulles Terminal Radar Approach report a primary radar return, tracking eastbound at high speed.

A National Guard C-130H cargo aircraft follows the track and identifies a Boeing 757. He’s found American Airlines Flight 77.

09:32 United Flight 93 announces “Ladies and Gentlemen: Here the captain, please sit down keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb on board. So, sit.” The autopilot is used to turn the aircraft around and head east.

The passengers and flight crew begin phoning to report the incident and are told of the crashes into the World Trade Center.

09:34 American Airlines Flight 77 is 5 miles west-southwest of the Pentagon. The aircraft begins a 330-degree turn and descends through 2,200 feet. The hijacker advances throttles to maximum power and dives toward the Pentagon.

09:36 Boston Center reports “Latest report. Aircraft VFR [visual flight rules] six miles southeast of the White House. . . . Six, southwest. Six, southwest of the White House, deviating away.”

The mission crew commander at Northeast Air Defense Sector takes control of the airspace to clear a flight path for the Langley fighters which are well out of range. “I don’t care how many windows you break,” he says.

09:37:46 American Airlines Flight 77 crashes into the Pentagon at approximately 530 miles per hour.

09:38 The National Guard C-130H cargo aircraft which was attempting to follow American Airlines Flight 77 reports “it looks like that aircraft crashed into the Pentagon Sir.” The Langley fighters are still about 150 miles away.

09:39 A further radio transmission is received from United Flight 93: “Uh, this is the captain. Would like you all to remain seated. There is a bomb on board and are going back to the airport, and to have our demands [unintelligible]. Please remain quiet.”

09:41 United Flight 93′s transponder is turned off.

The point of turning off the transponders is to make the planes “disappear” from a controller’s point of view. These attempts to hide the hijacked aircraft clearly added to the confusion of the morning.

09:57 The passengers of United Flight 93 assault the cockpit.

09:58 The hijacker flying United Flight 93 rolls the aircraft left and right in an attempt to knock the passengers off balance. He tells another hijacker to block the cockpit door and continues to roll the plane.

09:59 United Flight 93 is about 20 minutes flying time from Washington DC. The hijacker pitches the nose of the aircraft up and down to disrupt the assault.

10:00 The hijacker flying United Flight 93 stabilizes the aircraft and asks “Is that it? Shall we finish it off?” He receives a response from another hijacker, “No. Not yet. When they all come, we finish it off.” The pilot pitches the aircraft up and down again.

Another aircraft reports to controllers that he has seen the plane “waving his wings”.

10:01 United Flight 93 stabilizes again and the hijackers agree to “put it down”.

10:02:23 United Flight 93 plunges and the control wheel is turned hard to the right, rolling the aircraft onto its back. It crashes into an empty field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, travelling at approximately 580 miles per hour.

10:07 Northeast Air Defense Sector receive notification of United Flight 93′s hijack.

10:08 The National Guard C-130H cargo aircraft, which had resumed its planned flight to Minnesota, reports black smoke fifteen miles south of Johnstown. It is confirmed as corresponding to the last known position for United Flight 93.

All four aircraft were successfully hijacked and were crashed on purpose. Only three reached their targets.

Every person involved must have been so full of horror and fear as the events unravelled. I’m not ashamed to admit that after I finished putting together this timeline, I cried.

On the 1st of November in 2011, LOT airlines flight LO16 was flying into Warsaw-Okęcie when the main landing gear and nose gear failed to deploy. They landed on the fuselage on runway 33.

The Ministerstwo Transportu, Budownictwa I Gospodarki Morskiej (Ministry of Transport, Construction and Maritime Economy) have released a PDF of the accident description in English.

All times are in UTC.

04:19:51 Flight LO16, a Boeing B-767-300 takes off from Newark, New Jersey with 221 passengers, 8 cabin crew and 2 flight crew.

The flight crew consisted of two experienced Polish pilots. The captain has flown for LOT Polish Airlines since 1981 and at the time of the incident had 13,307 hours experience on the Boeing-767 (15,980 in total). The First Officer had 9,431 hours flight time, with 1,981 of those on the B-767. The aircraft was 25 years old and in good condition. It was inspected at Newark by the local maintenance crew and no faults were found.

04:19:55 The flight crew retracts the landing gear

04:21:07 The flight crew retracts the flaps

04:22:11 First indication of fault: low pressure in the central hydraulic system.

04:22:14 Hydraulic fluid quantity in the central hydraulic system drops dramatically.

A hydraulic fluid leak was discovered in the central hydraulic system (installation “C”).

A passenger commented on AVherald that in the cabin they heard “a strange noise like an electric or hydraulic motor triggered several times but failing to end its action.”

The loss of hydraulic pressure appeared to be an isolated fault and the flight crew and Operations crew agreed to continue the flight to Warsaw (EPWA), where they would extend the landing gear using the alternate landing gear extension system.

04:36:28 Cruise altitude FL310

The media questioned the decision to carry on, but a single failure does not necessarily require an immediate landing. The aircraft was safe to fly. There are back-up systems for the landing gear. Continuing to their destination gives them a planned daylight landing at their home airport rather than an emergency landing at Newark in the dark.

09:18:08 Cruise altitude FL370

The flight to Poland was uneventful. The METAR at Warsaw confirmed that there was good visibility with scattered low cloud, a slight tail wind over the runway, and no significant weather.

11:44:17 Flight LO16 begins descent to land.

During the approach to Warsaw-Okęcie the flight crew used the alternate system to extend the landing gear.

The landing gear did not extend.

12:18 Flight LO16 abandon approach and divert to holding zone. The alternate landing gear extension system continues to fail to lower the landing gear.

12:25 The flight crew declare an emergency.

12:45 Combat aircraft from a local Air Force base are sent to visually check the landing gear.

The flight crew are hoping that it is a computer glitch. Maybe the wheels are in fact all down and the failure is in the reporting.

13:06 The pilots of the combat aircraft confirm that the landing gear and nose gear are not visible, that is, they are still in the retracted position.

The crew attempt again to manually extend the landing gear “in the gravitational way”: that is, release the doors so that the wheels fall out of the plane and into position.

The landing gear does not extend.

As the fuel levels are dropping and all attempts to extend the landing gear have failed, the crew decide to execute an emergency landing with the landing gear retracted: landing on the belly of the plane.

13:39 The plane lands safely at Warsaw-Okęcie on runway 33. The passengers are evacuated immediately and are clear of the plane within 90 seconds. There are no injuries.

Passengers told the press that the landing was so smooth, they thought that at the last moment, the gear must have extended.

Investigators reached the aerodrome 15-20 minutes after the evacuation of the passengers and crew.

There they found a damaged hydrawlic hose in the right main landing gear which caused the failure of the central hydraulic system.

But they also found something more disturbing:

In the cockpit, on P6 panel, the circuit breaker C829 BAT BUS DISTR (on A1 position) was in the position „Off”, while the circuit breaker C4248 LANDING GEAR – ALTN EXT MOTOR (on F6 position) was in the position „On”.

Circuit breaker C829 BAT BUS DISTR includes the alternate landing gear extension system. There was no record of the breaker being off and the Flight Data Recorder and other airplane systems did not indicate that the breaker was off.

The captain has stated that they checked all circuit breakers twice and did not find any that had popped out.

It is possible that the circuit breaker popped out during the landing as a result of the alternate gear extender being left on. However, if the circuit breaker was out and they missed it, it puts an entirely new light on the response of the flight crew to the situation. I’ll be very interested to read the final report.

Meanwhile, Captain Tadeusz Wrona, with close to 20 years experience on the 767, is being hailed as a national hero for this excellent landing. Wrona means crow in Polish, leading to this new proverb:

Lataj jak orzeł, ląduj jak Wrona.

Fly like an eagle, land like a Crow.

Note: update with pilot comment at bottom of the post

Earlier this week, I linked* the following video of a 1947 Stinson 108 crash as seen from the cockpit:

This is unprecedented footage of a small airplane crash from inside the cockpit from two different views. Miraculously, everyone survived. The pilot will make a full recovery and the rest of us escaped with superficial injuries and feel very lucky to be alive.

This trip was much anticipated and due to our excitement we had our Gopro cameras filming at various times. After flying up into the mountains for a morning hike in the Frank Church River of No Return Wilderness we were planning on flying to a small mountain town for dinner. Due to warming temperatures there was an increase in density altitude and we had a hard time getting adequate lift.

After taking off we hit an air pocket that made us rapidly lose altitude, pushing us down into the trees. The cameras were left on for a couple of hours during the aftermath. Thank you to all the many individuals who eventually came to our aid and took the time and effort to help in any way they could. We appreciate you more than you know.

The aftermath: Two campers rushed there within about 15 to 20 minutes. They then went for help and found a retired paramedic and firefighter who came to our aid. About 50 minutes to and an hour after that a crew of fire fighters were driving through the area and somebody flagged them down. The fire crew cut down trees so a life flight helicopter could land. We really appreciated everyone’s help and effort. We feel very blessed to have had such great people respond so quickly.

The accident took place at Bruce Meadows Airport which has an elevation of 6,370 feet (1,940 metres). The maximum temperature reported for the region that day was 28°C/82°F which puts the airfield at over 9,000 feet density altitude.

70-year-old Boise pilot listed in serious condition after plane crash in Valley County
The pilot sustained serious injuries and he and one passenger were flown to the hospital in Boise by air ambulance. The aircraft was written off.

This 1947 Stinson 108 crashed on Saturday near rural Bear Valley, about 100 miles north of Boise in eastern Valley County.

Meanwhile, the NTSB investigation of this accident is in progress, although the preliminary report has already been released.

WPR12LA283

On June 30, 2012, about 1405 mountain daylight time, a Stinson 108-3, N773C, was substantially damaged after impacting terrain during initial climb near the Bruce Meadows Airport (U63), Stanley, Idaho. The certified commercial pilot sustained serious injuries, and the three passengers sustained minor injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local flight, which was being operated in accordance with 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91, and a flight plan was not filed. The flight was destined for the McCall Municipal Airport (MYL), McCall, Idaho.

In a telephone interview with the National Transportation Safety Board investigator-in-charge, the passenger who occupied the right rear seat reported that after taking off the pilot flew straight out for about three or four minutes, but the airplane would only ascend to about 60 to 70 feet above the tops of the trees. The passenger stated that the airplane started losing altitude and experienced a downdraft, which was followed by its wings impacting the tops of the surrounding trees. The airplane subsequently came down through the trees before impacting terrain inverted and sliding to a stop.

Aki009 on Liveleak posted the following, based on the video:

This image illustrates the problem the pilot had flying in high density altitude conditions. It appears that the pitch attitude is about 17 degrees, while the aircraft is not gaining altitude. Even if the measurement here is off by a degree or two, it’s obvious that the aircraft was flying just short of stall.

Note to self: if ever in a situation like this, land on the remaining runway; or land in the field before the trees; and try to crash as well as these guys did.

Redditor BinguniR34 did some homework on the weight and balance:

I am not one for making assumptions as far as verifiable data. I have just found a Weight and Balance spreadsheet for the Stinson 108 (accident aircraft). These are the numbers: Basic Empty Weight about 1400lbs. Max takeoff weight is 2150lbs. That gives you 750lbs of useful load.

Now, assumption of fuel load is needed: These Stinsons have fairly large engines, smallest option is an O-360. These engines burn on average 8-10gph. The trip that was to be flown is 44nm straight line distance, however with mountains in the vicinity, a more circuitous route may have been planned. I will assume an airborne time of at least 45 minutes. Which puts the absolute bare minimum required fuel at 1.25 hours worth (VFR reserve included). 12.5 gallons at 6 lbs per gallon, 75lbs.

Now, our useful load is brought down to 675lbs. Now, the FAA considers the average adult male to weigh 170lbs, with these numbers, the aircraft is already 5lbs overweight. The reality is, none of those guys looked like they were 170lbs or less. The three passengers look quite fit and fairly tall. I would place their weight at the very least 180lbs. The pilot, while not necessarily unfit, looks closer to 200lbs (remember, these are all clothed weights). With these updated weight numbers, the airplane is already 65lbs over gross.

Now, you must remember I used the bare legal minimum of fuel, the aircraft is capable of carrying 40 gallons, a full tank would add an additional 165lbs to the over gross figure. Additionally, I have not included any weight for baggage (I did not see any really, however, one guy is seen rummaging through the upturned aircraft) or equipment.

Well, chances are the aircraft was overweight… I have just found temperature information for the Stanley, ID area on June 30th, 2012, a high of 86F was recorded. I have no indication as to what the altimeter setting, and cannot make it out in the video either. If we assume that the typical good weather=high pressure, then we can assume a higher than standard altimeter setting. I used the current values, Temp, 86F (30C), alt setting of 30.00 and a dew point of 10C and field elevation of 6370. I got a density altitude value of 9556 feet! I am of course making assumptions, but I believe them to be fairly conservative assumptions.

All in all, those men were damned lucky to have survived.

* You can get the these links by becoming a friend of the Fear of Landing Facebook page and/or following @FearofLanding on Twitter. The latest link: How to Rescue a Goose with a Chainsaw

See also: Cockpit View of a Fatal Crash

UPDATE: AOPA analysis including interview with the pilot: YouTube accident pilot: ‘I was going to abort’

Last week, a Boeing C17 Globemaster III landed unexpectedly at Peter O. Knight Airport, a small GA airport in Tampa, Florida. The large military transport aircraft was meant to be flying into MacDill Air Force Base four miles away.

The plane was inbound from Southwest Asia with 23 passengers and 19 crew on board. The flight, over 15 hours long, may have led to the flight crew to being fatigued. The approach took place during daytime in full visual conditions.

Both airfields have runways aligned to 04/22 however, MacDill’s runway is 11,421 feet (3,481m) long. The runway at Peter O. Knight is only 3,405 feet (1,037m).

Here’s the view of both airfields from Google Maps:

The C17 managed the landing with a small amount of runway to spare, possibly a small consolation to the flight crew who chose the wrong airfield in the first place. An eye witness stated that the nose landing gear stopped about six to ten feet from the end of the runway.

The airfield was closed for a number of hours after the unexpected arrival of the C-17.

WTSP in Tampa has a gallery of photographs from after the landing. I suspect there were some pretty heavy conversations taking place.

A Boeing spokesman told FOX 13 that the plane would be able to take off from the short runway; however they suggested that the news channel speak to the Air Force for further comment on the situation (I can’t help wondering if they were sniggering). The Air Force does not appear to have made an official statement but the C17 was swiftly deployed to MacDill airfield later that day. It is not known whether the same flight crew were operating the aircraft.

In this footage of the departure posted onto YouTube, you can see just how oversized it is for the runway:

This is captured screen video of that US Air Force C-17 Globemaster that incorrectly landed at Peter O’Knight Airport yesterday. The air force flew it out of this tiny airport at dusk 07/20/2012. You can bet that was a career buster!

The approach plates for runway 22 at MacDill (PDF) include a specific reference to the opportunity for confusion.

WARNING: Use extreme caution
PETER O. KNIGHT arpt
4 NM NE of MACDILL AFB

So, it won’t have been the first time someone confused the two airfields. In fact, a user called The_Ginger posted to Base Operations military forums admitting that he had once almost made the same error:

C-17 Lands at Wrong Airport – Baseops Forums – Page 4

I’d be lying if I said I haven’t been in this exact situation – here’s the setup:

It’s my no-shit first flight as AC. Alerted off of Bravo at one on a Saturday morning to help start AMC’s Haiti earthquake relief. We’re rounding all the people we can get to mission plan and stage at Pope – at least a third of them are drunk.

It’s pretty much chaos around the sq trying to get everybody together and manifested.

Sister squadron commander found me, tapped his watch and said, “There are people watching this”.

Weather is 300 and 1/2.

We get gone, drop everybody off at Pope, and eventually get our upload figured out ( 2 Humvees and pax) and push on to MacDill to RON and head for Haiti in the morning.

When we start the descent into MCF, it’s right around 12 hours since alert.

I have buddy as my co-pilot who upgraded shortly after this trip – he has a significant amount of commercial time.

We get vectors to the ILS 22. Right as the (false) glideslope comes alive, we get asked if we have the field in sight. Since Knight is sitting right about at a 3 degree slope, I think that’s the field and start the descent after we’re cleared for the visual approach. Tower clears us to land because they see us on final.

The eng calls the go-around at 500′A. We quickly re-orient and get on the real glideslope.

As we’re taxiing in – I get the infamous “phone number to approach” relay. Much to my relief…they asked what I was doing…I fessed up and they said “don’t do it again” and that was it. I thought I was about to set the record for shortest time as AC….

Edit: we even read and briefed the note on the approach plate. At that time, it was a bit different and didn’t specifically name Knight field.

Local news reports that neither the aircraft nor the runway were damaged.

The MacDill Air Force Base Public Affairs Facebook page had no comment on the matter.

One of my pleasures on a Friday morning is to read the posts in Professional Pilots Rumour Network (known as PPRuNe for short) and this morning was no exception.

I was intrigued by a post by a Scottish controller asking a question of the Private Flying forum. I recognised the name as a regular poster; I’ve always fancied that this is the same controller who helped me out when the weather descended upon my destination of Glenforsa (Isle of Mull) and I had to divert to Prestwick. He is generally friendly and calm so I was surprised to see this agitated post and preponderance of punctuation.

Do you listen to ATC if they tell you the weather ahead is bad? – PPRuNe Forums

If you’re told the weather ahead is poor by ATC would you listen or just disregard??

Yesterday I was giving a service to a light aircraft operating VFR as he tried to route back to his Scottish base…..Being the helpful sort of guy that I am I obtained weather ahead from airfields that he was liable to have to fly over….to say the least these reports were poor….the best OVC at 600ft and the worst OVC at 300ft…….on advising him of this info he tells me “No, it’s fine where I am” as he decides to press on!!! What would you have done???

The outcome could have been a lot worse I fear!!

OVC is overcast; the cloud level on this day was too low for safe visual flight.

Well, no, I would not press on in such a situation. To be honest, I found it amazing that a pilot would. Unless, perhaps he was IFR – that is to say, flying on instruments – and simply didn’t think to notify the controller?

I had a feeling in my water that his plan was to try to maintain VFR….with the weather reports I gave him I knew that would not be possible…but then I was not the pilot just the “Area FISO” trying to help him!

The reason I have posted this is to try and help people learn…….In this instance I handed the aircraft off to an aerodrome Radar unit as it started to become obvious to me that his planned route would take him through their class D airspace……in the end I am glad I did.!!

It took me a while to connect the incident to the Scottish Sun article I’d seen linked earlier.

Lost pilot asks ‘Where the heli am I?’ | The Sun Scottish News

A TERRIFIED pilot was rescued by helicopter cops yesterday — after he got lost in the clouds.

The drama unfolded in the sky above Glasgow, after a cockpit failure left the pilot with no compass to work out where he was.

In a panic, he contacted flight controllers at Glasgow Airport who called in police to help the stricken Dyn-Aero two-seater plane.

Scores of people gathered on the ground below to see the demolition of the city’s Red Road flats looked on in horror as the Strathclyde force chopper came precariously close to colliding with the tiny aircraft.

One onlooker said: “The helicopter was flying only a few feet above the plane. They could easily have crashed.

“There were gasps from the crowd when people started noticing how close they were.

“It was really scary to see it from the ground. The poor pilot must’ve been terrified.”

The plane — on its way from Northampton to Perth — made an emergency landing at Glasgow Airport. A spokesman said: “The pilot was in radio contact with the control tower when he lost cockpit instruments including the compass.

The article is embarrassingly sensational and I have to wonder how you “lose” a compass, although later in the PPRuNe thread it’s clarified that he was believed to have lost his Directional Indicator. The aircraft itself was identified as a Dyn Aero MCR01 which is not permitted to fly in instrument conditions. The pilot certainly did not appear to have coped with the situation, even if he was licensed to fly with instruments.

My favourite post about the article:

I did think the current bun article was unfortunately funny.

The dirty Police pilot trying to mount an aero dyn in flight with a eurocopter.

I think a more usefull description would have been the police heli was shepherding a light aircraft back to safety.

And I would think the pilot was IFR and IFR being I Follow Roads.

The wonderful thing about the PPRuNe community is what a small world UK aviation is. Someone asked the question as to why the flight required a helicopter escort if he was simply lost. The response came from the pilot of the helicopter.

Ok just to give you some facts on this particular flight. I was flying Police51.

We were on task and asked by Glasgow ATC if we would be able to help an aircraft in distress that Edinburgh were working who had gone IMC between Glasgow and Edinburgh.

We transferred to Edinburgh approach as the subject aircraft radioed that he could now see some water below him and some ground and was going to decent.

Edinburgh vectored us towards the aircraft. He then announced that he was VFR again. Edinburgh asked him if he wanted to divert and he said yes. They said the weather was better at Glasgow, did he want to divert there and did he want our assistance. He said yes to both. We located him and offered him the option of following us back to Glasgow airport which he accepted. With local knowledge we led him over the least congested route to put him on a long final onto runway 23 at Glasgow.

When he was lined up and happy, we moved to the side and let him continue his approach to land.

I understand that when he went IMC his gyro toppled and Edinburgh were treating him as a ‘no compass no gyro’ aircraft.

All’s well that ends well but the weather was poor. I think I would have listened to [the controller's] advice

You can read the full thread – currently at 10 pages – including interesting discussions of options in similar situations, air navigation rules for the UK. and, as the controller put it, “how far you can push yourself and still comply with the VFR rules”.

All in a day’s work for PPRuNe professionals!