A Check Pilot noted that during the PIC’s Boeing 737 simulator Pilot – Proficiency Check dated 13 September 2005, the pilot maintained ‘speed high on touchdown’ during single engine landing.

Another Check Pilot noted that during the PIC’s Boeing 737 aircraft Line Check dated 18 August 2006, the pilot ‘did not comply with speed restriction procedure’ during arrival.

The Check Pilot who conducted the PIC’s Boeing 737 simulator Pilot – Proficiency Check dated 7 September 2006 did not note a concern about the previously noted speed findings.

There’s a lot more leeway given to a visual approach.

If the crew had specified an ILS approach, it would have been obvious to the radar controller from way back that they were not on the glidepath. It’s likely that ATC would have said something which might have broken through the pilot’s fixation.

Thanks for a great post, that’s a gut-wrenching story.
Being a (new minted) VFR pilot perhaps you could explain the significance of the ILS / Visual Approach misunderstanding with ATC – did this contribute in any way to the disaster or was it simply an early indication of communication breakdown.